Monday, January 24, 2011

My Story: For the Love of a Child - Part 1 of 4

I argued my first case before the Tennessee Supreme Court in 2002 in the case of Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140 (Tenn. 2003). The case made its way to the state’s highest court via what is know as an Extraordinary Appeal, an appeal where the trial court “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review.” R.10 Tenn.R.App.Proc. I filed the appeal on behalf of my client, the mother of two young children whom were taken from her and given to the paternal grandparents by the court based solely on the report of a guardian ad litem. During oral arguments before the high court, the grandparents’ attorney, William Monroe, stated to the court that it is rare for attorneys to be arguing constitutional issues in a family law matter. When I heard that statement, I thought to myself, “why“? Does the Constitution not apply to family law cases? My answer to myself was, “of course not”. I have first hand experience of the utter disregard of supposedly protected constitutional parental rights in child custody matters. I have also seen the same disregard day in and day out in the Shelby County courts, the disregard being hidden in the legal fiction of deciding cases “in the best interests of the child.” The Tennessee Supreme Court did rule in my client’s favor and she did get her children back. The Constitution actually prevailed in that case; unfortunately, that was the exception and it was not what normally occurs in child custody cases. Toms v. Toms will be discussed in depth in a future posting.

The facts of the Toms case solidified my disgust with the court system in child custody cases, especially when an extra attorney is involved - the guardian ad litem, “GAL”. In my own child custody case, Winchester v. Winchester, a GAL (then attorney and now Madison County Juvenile Court Judge Christy Rauchle Little) filed her “report” to the court with many false statements. My attorney at that time, Nancy Nelson, told me that Little favored mothers in child custody cases. Little did not show up for the trial, but just filed her “report” with the court, which recommended that my ex-wife be awarded custody of my daughter. The trial judge, Chancellor Joe Morris, awarded joint custody, and my ex-wife and I both appealed.

While the appeal was pending, I met a Memphis attorney, Tim Edwards, through a group called DAD, which stands for Dads Against Discrimination. We discussed my case and he said I should file a complaint against Little with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, “BPR”, the attorney policing arm of the Tennessee Supreme Court (in future postings, an in-depth look at the workings of the BPR, and the politics involved, will be made). Shortly after I filed the complaint against Little, my attorney called me and told me that Little had called her and that Little was upset about the complaint. My attorney told me that Little was her friend, and my attorney told me that I needed to find another attorney to finish my appeal. Edwards completed the appeal, but having to change attorneys in the middle of an appeal just does not look good to the court. Edwards and I also discussed the possibility of filing a lawsuit against Little, but when I was ready to do so, he decided not to do it, so I did it myself (at this time I was not an attorney, but I was in law school). By the way, the BPR, despite being furnished with documentary proof that Little had made false statements in her “report”, dismissed my complaint against her.

I filed a civil lawsuit, Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998), against Little in the Madison County Circuit Court for violation of federal constitutional and civil rights, as well as state claims. The attorneys that represented Little were Thomas H. Rainey, John D. Burleson, and Dale Conder, Jr., all with the law firm Rainey, Kizer, Butler, Reviere & Bell. (You will hear a lot more about that law firm, as well as Little, in future postings.) The trial judge, Julian P. Guinn, dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of immunity. In other words, it did not matter what Little did or did not do; since she was appointed by the court as a GAL, she was immune from liability - she could not be sued.

I appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that a GAL is not a “state actor” for purposes of the federal claims, but then holding that a GAL is entitled to “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” for purposes of the state claims because a GAL is an integral part of the judicial process. WHAT? If a GAL is part of the judicial process, does that not necessarily mean that the GAL is performing a state function, and, therefore, is a state actor? So, on the one hand, a GAL IS NOT a state actor if the GAL is being sued under federal law, but, on the other hand, that same GAL IS a state actor if being sued under state law, all in the same lawsuit.

Since the courts decided that Little was immune from liability, and therefore could not be sued, the actual facts stated in the lawsuit were never addressed by the courts, and the truth was legally suppressed.

End of Part 1.

No comments:

Post a Comment