Article VI, Sections 3 and 4, of the Tennessee Constitution state that the supreme court justices and the state trial judges and the judges of the inferior courts “shall be elected by the qualified voters.” This is part of the system of checks and balances so that the voters, the citizens, will have a say in whether or not a person should be a judge or remain a judge.
So why then is former Chancery Court Judge D.J. Alissandratos still trying cases as a “special judge.” Alissandratos did not run for re-election in the 2006 judicial elections; his profile on Resolute Systems, LLC, states that he retired as judge in 2006.
As stated in the post regarding the Anna Mae He international child custody case, Alissandratos recused himself from the case after the Hes and others filed complaints against him with the Court of the Judiciary. Here is a link to the He’s complaint, which was filed in 2004.
http://www.parentalrightsandjustice.com/index.cgi?ctype=Page;site_id=1;objid=24;curloc=Page:30
Again, why is Alissandratos still being appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court as a “special judge” to handle cases. Here are some of his cases (just a few of many):
JEFFREY COTTON v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY ET AL.
No. W2006-02291-SC-WCM-WC
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL, AT JACKSON
May 28, 2008, Filed
JUDGES: DONALD P. HARRIS, SR. J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. D.J. ALISSANDRATOS, SP. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined, and DONALD P. HARRIS, SR. J., concurred in part and dissented in part.
OPINION BY: D. J. ALISSANDRATOS
LEE NORA HUNTER v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA DIRECT, INC. ET AL.
No. W2006-02590-SC-WCM-WC
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL, AT JACKSON
April 3, 2008, Filed
JUDGES: DONALD P. HARRIS, SR. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and D. J. ALISSANDRATOS, SP. J., joined.
OPINION BY: DONALD P. HARRIS
SANDRA DELLER v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
No. W2007-00668-SC-WCM-WC
SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE, SPECIAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL, AT JACKSON
April 1, 2008, Filed
JUDGES: D.J. ALISSANDRATOS, SP.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and DONALD P. HARRIS, SR.J., joined.
OPINION BY: D. J. ALISSANDRATOS
Not only is Alissandratos consistently appointed as a “special judge”, other former judges, such as Donald Harris, are consistently appointed as “senior judges.” They are former judges who decided not to run for re-election and not be selected ‘by the qualified voters.” So why do they still get to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court to handle cases?
There are provisions under Tennessee law for the use of former judges as senior judges and special judges if the need arises due to conflicts of interest and case backlogs; however, the first resort in such cases is to use another duly elected judge within the judicial district or from another judicial district by interchange. Why isn’t this being done? I dare say there is no shortage of judges in Tennessee.
In the following, the internal quotes are from Title 17 of the Tennessee Code Annotated:
The unnecessary use of former, non-elected judges would seem to violate the Tennessee Constitution. It also adds a financial burden on all of the taxpayers because these former, non-elected judges are being “paid the same salary for the time served and receive the same expense allowance as are allowed the regular judges.” So Alissandratos still receives a judges pay for being a “special judge” even though he has not been elected.
In the case of Harris and other “senior judges,” who are former, non-elected judges as well, they receive “a salary calculated on the amount of time the senior justice or judge actually worked.” They also are “provided with suitable office space and equipment, secretarial and research assistance and a law library similar to that provided to active justices and judges.”
Why does this go on? Could it be judicial politics, good ole boys, cronyism? All I can say is that wasting taxpayer dollars for “special judges” and “senior judges” who are not elected “by the qualified voters” must STOP!
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Parental Alienation Syndrome ("PAS")
Below is a link to the Social Work Today journal, with an article entitled: Parental Alienation Syndrome — The Parent/Child Disconnect, by Amy J. L. Baker, PhD. The signs and symptoms described by Dr. Baker are the classic signs, and were ever present in my own child custody case with my oldest daughter, as will be described in My Story: For the Love of a Child, Part 4 of 4, which will be posted next week.
http://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/102708p26.shtml
http://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/102708p26.shtml
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
"Misery Funds a Legal Fiefdom" by Nina Berstein, 1994
Below is a link to an expose of the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court. Although written in 1994, it is just as applicable today due to the cronyism and nepotism within the walls of the castle located at 616 Adams Avenue.
http://64.17.135.19/APF_Stories/Bernstein/Bernstein01/Bernstein.html
Also, below is a copy of an email letter from retired Criminal Court Judge and now television famed Judge Joe Brown. It depicts the genesis of some of the major recurring issues in the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court.
To whom it may concern:
I am keeping up with this issue of naming the Juvenile Court facility after the Hon. Kenneth Turner. and with the matter of a second Juvenile Court Judgeship. As I am retired and no longer on the State bench I am entitled to express my opinion on the matter. I am much in favor of the latter proposition relative to a second judgeship and much against the former proposition relative to naming the institution after an individual that upon the record in an official proceeding I stated was "masquerading as a judge" and "lacked sufficient status and educational qualifications" to be one. During the course of proceedings subsequently arising - in part - from this utterance, the Supreme Court of this State did not take issue with the ultimate substance of the declaration. I am further of the opinion that the hubris of the Honorable Kenneth Turner, lately the nominal Judge of the Shelby County Juvenile Court for most of the last five decades has sustained a regime that has risen to the level of a fraud upon the people of Shelby County and the State of Tennessee.
Before I elaborate and touch upon only a few of the many points that need airing, let me first say that I had occasion to have represented many parties and petitioners, both plaintiff and defendant; both adult and juvenile in Juvenile Court. Further, I was involved with numerous Habeas Corpus proceedings against Juvenile Court as an attorney; as a presiding Judge of Criminal Court for the Circuit, I heard lengthily proceedings against them in further Habeas proceedings. I would convey the following information relative to the experiences that I have had in that august tribunal known as Shelby County Juvenile Court:
I was initially employed in the Memphis area with the Memphis and Shelby County Legal Services Association and had occasion to handle administrative matters for that entity relative to certain of their clientele with matters in Juvenile Court. I was not impressed with bedlam that I observed nor the efficacy of the proceedings.
On one early occasion of attendance upon Juvenile Court, way back when I was a new admittee to the Bar, I was shocked when the Hon. Judge Turner - mistaking me for a party litigant to the Court - called me the "N" word in open court. I must say that I look back on my very heated reaction with some satisfaction now and I am very glad that I responded as I did, indifferent to the consequences: However, four decades ago, contemporaneous with the events related, I must candidly confess that I did give just a wee bit of thought to being disbarred for what I said and did in response to the slur.
Over the years, the blatant and egregious remarks and conduct attributable to various parties in official attendance subsided to a certain extent to be replaced by more subtle transgressions. Publicly, there were a few noteworthy utterances attributed to the Hon. Judge Turner by the news media, such as references to certain of the juvenile subjects as "little bastards" as reported by the Commercial Appeal in at least one feature interview with the Judge in 1976 if I recall correctly.
There is an absolute and inflexible judicial ethic that requires any judicial officer to immediately resign upon qualifying as a candidate for a "non-judicial" office. The Hon. Kenneth Turner ran for Mayor of Memphis twice in the mid-seventies against the Honorable W. Otis Higgs, the presiding judge of Division IV of the Criminal Court at the time, and the Honorable Wyatt Chandler, the incumbent. Judge Higgs immediately complied with the code of ethics and resigned. Judge Turner did not on the occasion of his first nor second candidacy for the non-judicial office in question.
Decades later, Judge Higgs was again elected to judicial office and now sits on the Criminal Court Bench; Mayor Chandler ultimately was appointed then elected to the Civil Court Bench and has now honorably retired. The Hon. Kenneth Turner, in defiance of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, declined to resign and remained the Juvenile Court Judge.
Remarkably, no one seems to have lodged an official complaint against him. It seems quite clear that some interesting procedural and substantive issues would have been raised had anyone challenged him or his official activities on this particular point. One might reasonably ponder the inconsistency of appearing before an official who claimed to hold an office that the law clearly and absolutely forbade him to hold. It would seem that a reasonable conclusion is that the man has illegally held his judgeship for approximately thirty years.
In 1968, the Tennessee Legislature passed an act that required - from that point on - that any newly appointed or elected judge in this state would have to be an attorney admitted to practice before the Tennessee Bar as well as meeting certain qualifications relative to age and residency. Those who held office at the time were "grandfathered" in irrespective of their status as attorneys. Therefore, had the good judge properly resigned in compliance with the law when he first ran for city mayor in 1976, it should be noted that his non-attorney status would have prevented him from being returned to the office of Juvenile Court Judge by either appointment or election.
(As an interesting and pertinent aside, this legislative action also led to the authorization by the State Legislature of a second Juvenile Court Judgeship for Shelby County subject to the mandatory requirement that this individual would have to be an attorney admitted to practice in this state. Current Chancellor Walter Evans provided an excellent brief to the County Commission almost twenty years ago on the relevant points. Rather than pursuing the much more efficient and economical avenue presented by a second judgeship, The County has used an exorbitant number of referees and special judges at great and inflated expense to the tax-payers)
In addition to the shortcomings inherent in Judge Turner's non-lawyer status, the Honorable Judge himself - and his constituency as a consequence - has infirmities related to his complete lack of any formal training as a lawyer or in the law. In and of themselves these deficiencies are sufficiently severe that he has been unable to fulfill the requirements of his office: Officially, the good judge has not been permitted to hear any matters without the express written permission of all parties due to these educational infirmities since 1982 when the Tennessee Supreme Court held that litigants would otherwise be deprived of the Right to Counsel since Judge Turner would not be able to sufficiently comprehend the arguments and points of attorneys to give the person represented full benefit of his attorney's services.
The so-called standard procedures of the Shelby County Juvenile Court relative to the use of six or more referees and special judges superficially appear to be artifacts of the 1982 declaration of the State Supreme Court of the circumstances that led them to hold that the Honorable Judge Turner was unable to understand and fully comprehend the arguments of attorneys thereby depriving litigants of the benefits of exercising their Right of Representation by Counsel.
(It should be noted that in essence there are more referees employed in Juvenile Court than in all the other Circuit, Criminal and Chancery Courts combined. It might also be noted that every other referee in the county must be unanimously approved by every judge; Judge Turner was free to unilaterally select and employ the referees working Juvenile Court)
Unfortunately, this exorbitant and excessive use of referees and special judges long preceded the ruling of the State Supreme Court on the matter: It should be clearly understood that it was not just Judge Turner's non-lawyer status that lead to the remedial appointment of such a redundancy of referees and special judges. There actually was quite a serious deficiency in his capacity and ability to manage the necessary affairs of the court.
This is quite reflective of the same point we make over and over again when we tell the youth to stay in school and get an education! There are those that try to diminish the value of formal education or training, but it is irrefutable that certain levels of education are prerequisites to performing certain tasks.
During the course of Habeas Corpus proceedings heard before me on the Criminal Court Bench, I became fully apprised of Judge Turner's educational status through the introduction of Admissions produced in separate but related Federal Proceedings against Juvenile Court (there were similar issues in the Federal matter that were successfully prosecuted by the plaintiffs resulted in a significant monetary judgement against Juvenile Court that had to be borne by the tax-payers).
It would appear that the good judge lacked not only a law license, but also lacked any sort of law degree, bachelor's degree (college), or associate degree (community college). It would appear that the only sort of educational credential that he possessed was purportedly some sort of unofficially awarded correspondence course 'diploma' acquired from an obscure and now defunct business.
(While I suppose that it is commendable that Judge Turner has gone as far as he has with his limited education, we must consider the tremendously negative effect the last five decades of his reign have had on the citizens and youth of this community. Their needs and their necessities demanded sufficient education and training in the incumbent to enable him to fulfill the requirements of his office. It is the unfortunate fact that Judge Turner was actually quite incompetent to handle the business of the court due to his educational infirmities and that circumstance has been manifest for decades now)
Perhaps it was with a surplus of time on his hands relative to the handling of court business that prompted Judge Turner to drift from the business and workings of the Judicial Branch of government to the business of the Executive Branch. It appears that the principle activity of the good judge has been to put together an organization that to all intents and purposes functions as a collective alternative to a number of Executive agencies including but not limited to the District Attorney General's Office; the police and Sheriff's departments; the Department of Human Services; Child Protective Services; the Department of Corrections.
If we were not speaking of a Juvenile Court and spoke of judicial institutions with which we might be more conversant, perhaps the analogy that would best show the wrong of this is as follows: The Criminal Court Judge that the defendant found himself appearing before was also the same person who was Chief of Police, Chief Prosecutor, Chief Defender, Chief Investigator and Chief Advocate for the alleged victim and Chief Jailer. Sounds like a foreign country with 'Fearless Leader' in charge. Well that is precisely the same situation as exists in Juvenile Justice.
The same individual who was supposed to be the fair, impartial, neutral and detached judge was the same person who had a personal contract with the Shelby County Commission to prosecute child support violations; the same person who had personally contracted with the Department of Human Services to represent them in proceedings against alleged fathers; the same person that had agreements with the IRS, Soc. Sec. and other agencies to investigate alleged offenders; to operate juvenile detention facilities and to privatize them and become a principle share holder in the enterprise; the principle collector and dispenser of money; and to keep his own records (subsequently thwarted by the State Supreme Court when it ruled that the Clerk of the Juvenile Court was a Constitutional position that had to be filled by public election).
In functional fact, Judge Turner did not do all these things personally, but created an empire where everyone worked for him and he delegated these tasks to them. He hired, supervised and fired. Sound strange? It was and is strange. The Federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1986 decision of Severe vs. Turner et al thought so too and declared that there was absolutely no constitutional authority for any one person to embrace all of these separate and distinct powers and functions reflective of these disparate executive governmental entities. It was further held that any such activity was completely outside the proper authority and power of a judge and was done without the protection of authority. Such exercise of power was held to constituted personal and private acts by the actor leaving him personally liable to anyone who might prove that they had been wronged. The tax-payers unwittingly paid out considerable sums to multiple parties who had been wronged by such unlawful action by Juvenile Court and the good Judge.
Sitting Judges have long been prohibited by judicial canons of ethics from active participation in partisan politics. Of course, this sanction and absolute prohibition has been totally ignored over the years by the Honorable Kenneth Turner with out comeuppance. Judge Turner was strident in his long term insistence that his non-lawyer status exempted him from such prohibitions; further, he often demanded and obtained the assistance of his employee staff in various political campaigns and activities.
I could really belabor the point of impropriety and discuss at some great length Judge Turner's activities during the Sanitation Strike during 1968 and his personal efforts to thwart Dr. King's civil rights activities in this city immediately before his assassination at the Loraine Motel. However, a mere mention of his threats to the African-American parents relative to them allowing their children to participate in the boycott of the schools should suffice for those with need for refreshment of their personal recollections.
On the other hand, Mr. Shep Wilburn, late of the office of Clerk of the Juvenile Court, was subject to considerable negative innuendo in the media after he discovered several million dollars of Juvenile Court Money that had been deposited in a non-interest bearing account for a decade. He was entirely too nice in his handling of the matter and had his name besmirched in the process. The money was secreted away by parties at Juvenile Court to use as collateral for personal and political loans. That is typical of the long and short of the matter.
For the life of me, I cannot think of much positive in the way of commentary on the last half-century of the operation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court system. It does fit in with the baby selling scandal of the administration of the Lady Judge next preceding the Honorable Kenneth Turner but that's only a small point.
Thank you for your indulgence in perusing this essay. I remain yours in duty and obligation.
Sincerely,
Joseph B. Brown
Judge Joe Brown Show;
Judge, Retired, Division IX of the Criminal Courts of
Tennessee, 30 th Judicial District at Memphis
These remarks are delivered in my personal and private capacity and reflect the views of the writer. Feel free to disseminate them as you see fit.
http://64.17.135.19/APF_Stories/Bernstein/Bernstein01/Bernstein.html
Also, below is a copy of an email letter from retired Criminal Court Judge and now television famed Judge Joe Brown. It depicts the genesis of some of the major recurring issues in the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court.
To whom it may concern:
I am keeping up with this issue of naming the Juvenile Court facility after the Hon. Kenneth Turner. and with the matter of a second Juvenile Court Judgeship. As I am retired and no longer on the State bench I am entitled to express my opinion on the matter. I am much in favor of the latter proposition relative to a second judgeship and much against the former proposition relative to naming the institution after an individual that upon the record in an official proceeding I stated was "masquerading as a judge" and "lacked sufficient status and educational qualifications" to be one. During the course of proceedings subsequently arising - in part - from this utterance, the Supreme Court of this State did not take issue with the ultimate substance of the declaration. I am further of the opinion that the hubris of the Honorable Kenneth Turner, lately the nominal Judge of the Shelby County Juvenile Court for most of the last five decades has sustained a regime that has risen to the level of a fraud upon the people of Shelby County and the State of Tennessee.
Before I elaborate and touch upon only a few of the many points that need airing, let me first say that I had occasion to have represented many parties and petitioners, both plaintiff and defendant; both adult and juvenile in Juvenile Court. Further, I was involved with numerous Habeas Corpus proceedings against Juvenile Court as an attorney; as a presiding Judge of Criminal Court for the Circuit, I heard lengthily proceedings against them in further Habeas proceedings. I would convey the following information relative to the experiences that I have had in that august tribunal known as Shelby County Juvenile Court:
I was initially employed in the Memphis area with the Memphis and Shelby County Legal Services Association and had occasion to handle administrative matters for that entity relative to certain of their clientele with matters in Juvenile Court. I was not impressed with bedlam that I observed nor the efficacy of the proceedings.
On one early occasion of attendance upon Juvenile Court, way back when I was a new admittee to the Bar, I was shocked when the Hon. Judge Turner - mistaking me for a party litigant to the Court - called me the "N" word in open court. I must say that I look back on my very heated reaction with some satisfaction now and I am very glad that I responded as I did, indifferent to the consequences: However, four decades ago, contemporaneous with the events related, I must candidly confess that I did give just a wee bit of thought to being disbarred for what I said and did in response to the slur.
Over the years, the blatant and egregious remarks and conduct attributable to various parties in official attendance subsided to a certain extent to be replaced by more subtle transgressions. Publicly, there were a few noteworthy utterances attributed to the Hon. Judge Turner by the news media, such as references to certain of the juvenile subjects as "little bastards" as reported by the Commercial Appeal in at least one feature interview with the Judge in 1976 if I recall correctly.
There is an absolute and inflexible judicial ethic that requires any judicial officer to immediately resign upon qualifying as a candidate for a "non-judicial" office. The Hon. Kenneth Turner ran for Mayor of Memphis twice in the mid-seventies against the Honorable W. Otis Higgs, the presiding judge of Division IV of the Criminal Court at the time, and the Honorable Wyatt Chandler, the incumbent. Judge Higgs immediately complied with the code of ethics and resigned. Judge Turner did not on the occasion of his first nor second candidacy for the non-judicial office in question.
Decades later, Judge Higgs was again elected to judicial office and now sits on the Criminal Court Bench; Mayor Chandler ultimately was appointed then elected to the Civil Court Bench and has now honorably retired. The Hon. Kenneth Turner, in defiance of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, declined to resign and remained the Juvenile Court Judge.
Remarkably, no one seems to have lodged an official complaint against him. It seems quite clear that some interesting procedural and substantive issues would have been raised had anyone challenged him or his official activities on this particular point. One might reasonably ponder the inconsistency of appearing before an official who claimed to hold an office that the law clearly and absolutely forbade him to hold. It would seem that a reasonable conclusion is that the man has illegally held his judgeship for approximately thirty years.
In 1968, the Tennessee Legislature passed an act that required - from that point on - that any newly appointed or elected judge in this state would have to be an attorney admitted to practice before the Tennessee Bar as well as meeting certain qualifications relative to age and residency. Those who held office at the time were "grandfathered" in irrespective of their status as attorneys. Therefore, had the good judge properly resigned in compliance with the law when he first ran for city mayor in 1976, it should be noted that his non-attorney status would have prevented him from being returned to the office of Juvenile Court Judge by either appointment or election.
(As an interesting and pertinent aside, this legislative action also led to the authorization by the State Legislature of a second Juvenile Court Judgeship for Shelby County subject to the mandatory requirement that this individual would have to be an attorney admitted to practice in this state. Current Chancellor Walter Evans provided an excellent brief to the County Commission almost twenty years ago on the relevant points. Rather than pursuing the much more efficient and economical avenue presented by a second judgeship, The County has used an exorbitant number of referees and special judges at great and inflated expense to the tax-payers)
In addition to the shortcomings inherent in Judge Turner's non-lawyer status, the Honorable Judge himself - and his constituency as a consequence - has infirmities related to his complete lack of any formal training as a lawyer or in the law. In and of themselves these deficiencies are sufficiently severe that he has been unable to fulfill the requirements of his office: Officially, the good judge has not been permitted to hear any matters without the express written permission of all parties due to these educational infirmities since 1982 when the Tennessee Supreme Court held that litigants would otherwise be deprived of the Right to Counsel since Judge Turner would not be able to sufficiently comprehend the arguments and points of attorneys to give the person represented full benefit of his attorney's services.
The so-called standard procedures of the Shelby County Juvenile Court relative to the use of six or more referees and special judges superficially appear to be artifacts of the 1982 declaration of the State Supreme Court of the circumstances that led them to hold that the Honorable Judge Turner was unable to understand and fully comprehend the arguments of attorneys thereby depriving litigants of the benefits of exercising their Right of Representation by Counsel.
(It should be noted that in essence there are more referees employed in Juvenile Court than in all the other Circuit, Criminal and Chancery Courts combined. It might also be noted that every other referee in the county must be unanimously approved by every judge; Judge Turner was free to unilaterally select and employ the referees working Juvenile Court)
Unfortunately, this exorbitant and excessive use of referees and special judges long preceded the ruling of the State Supreme Court on the matter: It should be clearly understood that it was not just Judge Turner's non-lawyer status that lead to the remedial appointment of such a redundancy of referees and special judges. There actually was quite a serious deficiency in his capacity and ability to manage the necessary affairs of the court.
This is quite reflective of the same point we make over and over again when we tell the youth to stay in school and get an education! There are those that try to diminish the value of formal education or training, but it is irrefutable that certain levels of education are prerequisites to performing certain tasks.
During the course of Habeas Corpus proceedings heard before me on the Criminal Court Bench, I became fully apprised of Judge Turner's educational status through the introduction of Admissions produced in separate but related Federal Proceedings against Juvenile Court (there were similar issues in the Federal matter that were successfully prosecuted by the plaintiffs resulted in a significant monetary judgement against Juvenile Court that had to be borne by the tax-payers).
It would appear that the good judge lacked not only a law license, but also lacked any sort of law degree, bachelor's degree (college), or associate degree (community college). It would appear that the only sort of educational credential that he possessed was purportedly some sort of unofficially awarded correspondence course 'diploma' acquired from an obscure and now defunct business.
(While I suppose that it is commendable that Judge Turner has gone as far as he has with his limited education, we must consider the tremendously negative effect the last five decades of his reign have had on the citizens and youth of this community. Their needs and their necessities demanded sufficient education and training in the incumbent to enable him to fulfill the requirements of his office. It is the unfortunate fact that Judge Turner was actually quite incompetent to handle the business of the court due to his educational infirmities and that circumstance has been manifest for decades now)
Perhaps it was with a surplus of time on his hands relative to the handling of court business that prompted Judge Turner to drift from the business and workings of the Judicial Branch of government to the business of the Executive Branch. It appears that the principle activity of the good judge has been to put together an organization that to all intents and purposes functions as a collective alternative to a number of Executive agencies including but not limited to the District Attorney General's Office; the police and Sheriff's departments; the Department of Human Services; Child Protective Services; the Department of Corrections.
If we were not speaking of a Juvenile Court and spoke of judicial institutions with which we might be more conversant, perhaps the analogy that would best show the wrong of this is as follows: The Criminal Court Judge that the defendant found himself appearing before was also the same person who was Chief of Police, Chief Prosecutor, Chief Defender, Chief Investigator and Chief Advocate for the alleged victim and Chief Jailer. Sounds like a foreign country with 'Fearless Leader' in charge. Well that is precisely the same situation as exists in Juvenile Justice.
The same individual who was supposed to be the fair, impartial, neutral and detached judge was the same person who had a personal contract with the Shelby County Commission to prosecute child support violations; the same person who had personally contracted with the Department of Human Services to represent them in proceedings against alleged fathers; the same person that had agreements with the IRS, Soc. Sec. and other agencies to investigate alleged offenders; to operate juvenile detention facilities and to privatize them and become a principle share holder in the enterprise; the principle collector and dispenser of money; and to keep his own records (subsequently thwarted by the State Supreme Court when it ruled that the Clerk of the Juvenile Court was a Constitutional position that had to be filled by public election).
In functional fact, Judge Turner did not do all these things personally, but created an empire where everyone worked for him and he delegated these tasks to them. He hired, supervised and fired. Sound strange? It was and is strange. The Federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1986 decision of Severe vs. Turner et al thought so too and declared that there was absolutely no constitutional authority for any one person to embrace all of these separate and distinct powers and functions reflective of these disparate executive governmental entities. It was further held that any such activity was completely outside the proper authority and power of a judge and was done without the protection of authority. Such exercise of power was held to constituted personal and private acts by the actor leaving him personally liable to anyone who might prove that they had been wronged. The tax-payers unwittingly paid out considerable sums to multiple parties who had been wronged by such unlawful action by Juvenile Court and the good Judge.
Sitting Judges have long been prohibited by judicial canons of ethics from active participation in partisan politics. Of course, this sanction and absolute prohibition has been totally ignored over the years by the Honorable Kenneth Turner with out comeuppance. Judge Turner was strident in his long term insistence that his non-lawyer status exempted him from such prohibitions; further, he often demanded and obtained the assistance of his employee staff in various political campaigns and activities.
I could really belabor the point of impropriety and discuss at some great length Judge Turner's activities during the Sanitation Strike during 1968 and his personal efforts to thwart Dr. King's civil rights activities in this city immediately before his assassination at the Loraine Motel. However, a mere mention of his threats to the African-American parents relative to them allowing their children to participate in the boycott of the schools should suffice for those with need for refreshment of their personal recollections.
On the other hand, Mr. Shep Wilburn, late of the office of Clerk of the Juvenile Court, was subject to considerable negative innuendo in the media after he discovered several million dollars of Juvenile Court Money that had been deposited in a non-interest bearing account for a decade. He was entirely too nice in his handling of the matter and had his name besmirched in the process. The money was secreted away by parties at Juvenile Court to use as collateral for personal and political loans. That is typical of the long and short of the matter.
For the life of me, I cannot think of much positive in the way of commentary on the last half-century of the operation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court system. It does fit in with the baby selling scandal of the administration of the Lady Judge next preceding the Honorable Kenneth Turner but that's only a small point.
Thank you for your indulgence in perusing this essay. I remain yours in duty and obligation.
Sincerely,
Joseph B. Brown
Judge Joe Brown Show;
Judge, Retired, Division IX of the Criminal Courts of
Tennessee, 30 th Judicial District at Memphis
These remarks are delivered in my personal and private capacity and reflect the views of the writer. Feel free to disseminate them as you see fit.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
APA Child Custody Guidelines
This is a link to the American Psychological Association's Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations:
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/child-custody.pdf
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/child-custody.pdf
Friday, February 11, 2011
Psychologists that go Psycho - Part 1 of 2
Almost as often as the courts appoint GALs to represent the legal fiction of “the best interests of the child”, the courts appoint psychologists to do custody evaluations. Just as Judge Kurtz commented about the overuse of GALs in Shelby County (refer back to the GALs Gone Wild blogs), psychologists are overused in Shelby County as well.
Part 1 of Psychologists that go Psycho refers to just two cases, In the matter of Anna Mae He (which was the subject of a post two weeks ago), and Malmquist v. Malmquist.
In Anna Mae He, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in its opinion reversing the decision of Judge Childers, make two stinging comments about Judge Childers’ findings about the testimony of the psychologists:
Several psychologists testified at the trial. None of these witnesses opined that harm would result from continued contact between A.M.H. and her parents or from expanded visitation. Dr. Goldstein, the court-appointed expert, testified that he did not conduct evaluations of the child or the parties (even though evaluations were ordered) and that he did not investigate the attachment between A.M.H. and her parents prior to writing his report. On September 23, 2003, he did monitor the videotaped session with the parents and A.M.H. Dr. Goldstein testified, “I did assume that there was very little attachment to the [parents] based upon the information that I had and based also on my knowledge of psychological development.” Dr. Goldstein did not bring all of his notes to the trial. He testified that he was unable to say whether visitation should take place and unable to give any opinion as to custody. Dr. Goldstein limited his opinion to the best interest of the child, and even as to that topic, he would not render an opinion on whether having no further contact with her parents would be in A.M.H.’s best interest. The chancery court found Dr. Goldstein to be “highly qualified, highly respected . . . . Very knowledgeable, honest and a forthright witness.”
At the trial, the parents of A.M.H. introduced evidence from three psychologists and a Chinese culture expert to refute the inference that the parents intended for the Bakers to raise A.M.H., to refute the opinion that A.M.H. had no attachment to her parents, and to show that the parents presented no abnormal psychological traits. The psychological experts offered by the parents pointed out what they perceived to be flaws in Dr. Goldstein’s process and report. Dr. John Robert Hutson testified that he had reviewed Dr. Goldstein’s deposition and report and that Dr. Goldstein did no evaluations of the parties. Dr. Hutson opined that there should be ongoing contact between the parents and A.M.H. Both Dr. Hutson and another psychologist, Dr. John Victor Ciocca, reviewed the video of the parents visiting with A.M.H. and found that the child responded favorably to the parents and the parents acted appropriately. The testimony offered by the parents was critical of the court’s prevention of visitation with the child and of Dr. Goldstein’s failure to perform certain evaluations. However, the court found this testimony to be “of little assistance to the court” because Drs. Hutson and Ciocca had never personally interviewed A.M.H.
(emphasis added).
Well, the “highly qualified, highly respected” Dr. Goldstein “did not conduct evaluation of the child … even though evaluations were ordered” either, so why should his testimony be credited when he did not follow the court’s orders? Of course Drs. Hutson and Ciocca were critical of the court preventing visitation between Anna Mae and her biological parents, and as I stated in the Anna Mae He blog, Judge Childers was scornful to attorneys that publicly decried his decision, so it is no wonder that he discredited the testimony of two of Shelby County’s more prominent and respected psychologists since they were critical of the court preventing contact between Anna Mae and her real parents.
In Malmquist v. Malmquist (the conflict and problems with the GAL in this case were discussed in the GALs Gone Wild blog), another court-appointed psychologist (who is supposed to be a neutral, court-appointed expert) “crossed the line” when he accepted payments from the father to assist the father in countering the testimony of two other psychologists. Even so, the trial judge, Jerry Stokes, denied the following motion to strike the Dr. Steinberg’s testimony. The following motion explains it all.
Defendant Danielle Malmquist, by and through counsel, for her Motion to Strike Testimony of Dr. Steinberg as it Relates to Defendant Danielle Malmquist, in that Dr. Steinberg has crossed the line from being a court-appointed neutral to being a retained expert for the Plaintiff, and as grounds thereto, Defendant states as follows:
1. This Court entered a Consent Order appointing Dr. Steinberg as the third court appointed expert in this cause. Said order stated, in pertinent part, that:
Dr. Fred A. Steinberg, PhD. Shall perform a comprehensive psychological evaluation of the parties for purposes of assisting the Court regarding the mental and emotional status of the parties relative to the divorce and fitness for parenting the minor children.
2. Pursuant to subsequent orders, Plaintiff Shem Malmquist was required to pay both parties’ share of the retainer for Dr. Steinberg, which was $5,000.00 total.
3. Even though Dr. Steinberg could have simply come to Court and given testimony regarding his findings, Dr. Steinberg did significantly more at the request of the Plaintiff, for which Dr. Steinberg received substantial payments from the Plaintiff. This included preparing an elaborate slide show regarding Dr. Steinberg’s “findings”, which during the trial of this matter, Dr. Steinberg had on the screen a so-called chart of alleged peaks of Defendant’s MMPI-2 results, for an extended period of time even though said chart was not being discussed.
4. Plaintiff paid Dr. Steinberg an additional $8,750.00 to prepare for trial.
5. Plaintiff also paid Dr. Steinberg an additional $1,700.00 to sit in and listen to the testimony of the first Court appointed expert, Dr. Ciocca, as well as Defendant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Aronov. Further, during Dr. Ciocca’s and Dr. Aronov’s testimony, Dr. Steinberg was in continual communication, in the courtroom, giving counsel and advice to Plaintiff’s attorney for the purposes of cross examining Dr. Ciocca and Dr. Aronov. Said activities were not within the scope of Dr. Steinberg’s appointment as a court appointed expert.
6. The order appointing Dr. Steinberg merely required Dr. Steinberg to “perform a comprehensive psychological evaluation of the parties for purposes of assisting the Court regarding the mental and emotional status of the parties relative to the divorce and fitness for parenting the minor children.”
a. Said order DID NOT provide for Dr. Steinberg to listen to the testimony of the first court appointed expert, Dr. Ciocca, for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff’s attorney to challenge the first court appointed expert’s findings.
b. Said order DID NOT provide for Dr. Steinberg to listen to the testimony of Defendant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Aronov, for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff’s attorney to cross-examine the treating psychologist’s testimony and diagnosis.
7. In addition to the above-mentioned payments, Plaintiff paid Dr. Steinberg another $1,600.00 to appear and testify at trial regarding his so-called “findings”. Critical to the trustworthiness of Dr. Steinberg’s findings are:
a. When first cross-examined by Defendant’s counsel, Dr. Steinberg was asked whether or not some items of the MMPI-2 were omitted by Defendant, and if Dr. Steinberg later met with Defendant and filled in the omitted items, to which Dr. Steinberg answered, “Yes”. Only when Defendant’s counsel asked the follow-up question that by so-doing, the entire MMPI-2 evaluation was invalid, did Dr. Steinberg start scurrying through his notes and conveniently changed his testimony to “No”.
b. When asked about Dr. Steinberg’s scoring of the MMPI-2, Dr. Steinberg testified that he “hand-scored” the MMPI-2. Dr. Aronov, a renowned expert on the MMPI-2, testified that hand-scoring can result in error rates as high as twenty percent (20%). Further, there are numerous erasure marks of the actual MMPI-2 answer sheet.
c. When questioned about certain questions on the MMPI-2 regarding whether a person believed she were being followed all of the time, or if a person believed is somebody is out to get her, Dr. Steinberg became very evasive. The questioning involved elevations on the Defendant’s paranoia scale, and if the facts showed that people were actually following the Defendant, would that result in a false elevation of the paranoia scale. Defendant’s counsel asked DR. Steinberg the same of similar question five times, and then the Court asked a similar question, and Dr. Steinberg’s responses continually evaded the question asked. Such evasion clearly DID NOT assist the Court, as required by this Court’s order.
d. When asked questions regarding the about the reliability of the Rorschach test in a forensic setting, and the subjectiveness of said test, Dr. Steinberg became very evasive, and refused to answer questions regarding his interpretations of the Defendant’s answers, as well as how certain responses would be scored. Dr. Steinberg testified the psychologists were “sworn to secrecy” regarding answering such questions. Both Dr. Ciocca and Dr. Steinberg testified that psychologists were not sworn to secrecy regarding such questions, and Dr. Ciocca further testified that such questions would have to be answered in order to meet Daubert requirements. Accordingly, this in and of itself INVALIDATES Dr. Steinberg’s testimony and findings under the Daubert rule.
8. Plaintiff’s counsel had stated several times that Plaintiff may recall Dr. Steinberg in rebuttal to Dr. Ciocca, the first court appointed expert, and Dr. Aronov. The order appointing Dr. Steinberg clearly does not anticipate one court appointed expert rebutting the testimony of another court appointed expert. Further, said order does not anticipate a court appointed expert rebutting a treating psychologist. Said activities clearly exceed the scope of Dr. Steinberg’s appointment and show that Dr. Steinberg is not a court appointed neutral, but rather a retained expert for the Plaintiff.
9. The “consent order” appointing Dr. Steinberg was for the purposes of Dr. Steinberg acting as a court appointed neutral, not an advocate for the Plaintiff. Defendant DID NOT consent to an evaluation by the Plaintiff’s retained expert. Since Dr. Steinberg has clearly crossed that line, both legally and ethically, said “consent” in invalid, and any testimony, testing, and “findings” as the result of said consent must be stricken.
10. Since Dr. Steinberg refused to answer certain questions regarding the Rorschach test, since Dr. Steinberg hand-scored the MMPI-2, since Dr. Steinberg was evasive to questioning, including the Court’s questions, regarding some of the questions and results of the MMPI-2, and since Dr. Steinberg changed his testimony regarding Defendant omitting certain questions on the MMPI-2 and whether Dr. Steinberg later filled in the answers, Dr. Steinberg’s testimony, testing, and “findings” do not meet the minimal requirements of Daubert.
FROM ALL, DR. Steinberg’s testimony, test results, and “findings” as they relate to
Defendant Danielle Malmquist should be stricken and excluded.
In both cases, the old axiom is clear, “money talks”.
End of Part 1.
Part 1 of Psychologists that go Psycho refers to just two cases, In the matter of Anna Mae He (which was the subject of a post two weeks ago), and Malmquist v. Malmquist.
In Anna Mae He, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in its opinion reversing the decision of Judge Childers, make two stinging comments about Judge Childers’ findings about the testimony of the psychologists:
Several psychologists testified at the trial. None of these witnesses opined that harm would result from continued contact between A.M.H. and her parents or from expanded visitation. Dr. Goldstein, the court-appointed expert, testified that he did not conduct evaluations of the child or the parties (even though evaluations were ordered) and that he did not investigate the attachment between A.M.H. and her parents prior to writing his report. On September 23, 2003, he did monitor the videotaped session with the parents and A.M.H. Dr. Goldstein testified, “I did assume that there was very little attachment to the [parents] based upon the information that I had and based also on my knowledge of psychological development.” Dr. Goldstein did not bring all of his notes to the trial. He testified that he was unable to say whether visitation should take place and unable to give any opinion as to custody. Dr. Goldstein limited his opinion to the best interest of the child, and even as to that topic, he would not render an opinion on whether having no further contact with her parents would be in A.M.H.’s best interest. The chancery court found Dr. Goldstein to be “highly qualified, highly respected . . . . Very knowledgeable, honest and a forthright witness.”
At the trial, the parents of A.M.H. introduced evidence from three psychologists and a Chinese culture expert to refute the inference that the parents intended for the Bakers to raise A.M.H., to refute the opinion that A.M.H. had no attachment to her parents, and to show that the parents presented no abnormal psychological traits. The psychological experts offered by the parents pointed out what they perceived to be flaws in Dr. Goldstein’s process and report. Dr. John Robert Hutson testified that he had reviewed Dr. Goldstein’s deposition and report and that Dr. Goldstein did no evaluations of the parties. Dr. Hutson opined that there should be ongoing contact between the parents and A.M.H. Both Dr. Hutson and another psychologist, Dr. John Victor Ciocca, reviewed the video of the parents visiting with A.M.H. and found that the child responded favorably to the parents and the parents acted appropriately. The testimony offered by the parents was critical of the court’s prevention of visitation with the child and of Dr. Goldstein’s failure to perform certain evaluations. However, the court found this testimony to be “of little assistance to the court” because Drs. Hutson and Ciocca had never personally interviewed A.M.H.
(emphasis added).
Well, the “highly qualified, highly respected” Dr. Goldstein “did not conduct evaluation of the child … even though evaluations were ordered” either, so why should his testimony be credited when he did not follow the court’s orders? Of course Drs. Hutson and Ciocca were critical of the court preventing visitation between Anna Mae and her biological parents, and as I stated in the Anna Mae He blog, Judge Childers was scornful to attorneys that publicly decried his decision, so it is no wonder that he discredited the testimony of two of Shelby County’s more prominent and respected psychologists since they were critical of the court preventing contact between Anna Mae and her real parents.
In Malmquist v. Malmquist (the conflict and problems with the GAL in this case were discussed in the GALs Gone Wild blog), another court-appointed psychologist (who is supposed to be a neutral, court-appointed expert) “crossed the line” when he accepted payments from the father to assist the father in countering the testimony of two other psychologists. Even so, the trial judge, Jerry Stokes, denied the following motion to strike the Dr. Steinberg’s testimony. The following motion explains it all.
MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF DR. STEINBERG
AS IT RELATES TO DEFENDANT DANIELLE MALMQUIST
Defendant Danielle Malmquist, by and through counsel, for her Motion to Strike Testimony of Dr. Steinberg as it Relates to Defendant Danielle Malmquist, in that Dr. Steinberg has crossed the line from being a court-appointed neutral to being a retained expert for the Plaintiff, and as grounds thereto, Defendant states as follows:
1. This Court entered a Consent Order appointing Dr. Steinberg as the third court appointed expert in this cause. Said order stated, in pertinent part, that:
Dr. Fred A. Steinberg, PhD. Shall perform a comprehensive psychological evaluation of the parties for purposes of assisting the Court regarding the mental and emotional status of the parties relative to the divorce and fitness for parenting the minor children.
2. Pursuant to subsequent orders, Plaintiff Shem Malmquist was required to pay both parties’ share of the retainer for Dr. Steinberg, which was $5,000.00 total.
3. Even though Dr. Steinberg could have simply come to Court and given testimony regarding his findings, Dr. Steinberg did significantly more at the request of the Plaintiff, for which Dr. Steinberg received substantial payments from the Plaintiff. This included preparing an elaborate slide show regarding Dr. Steinberg’s “findings”, which during the trial of this matter, Dr. Steinberg had on the screen a so-called chart of alleged peaks of Defendant’s MMPI-2 results, for an extended period of time even though said chart was not being discussed.
4. Plaintiff paid Dr. Steinberg an additional $8,750.00 to prepare for trial.
5. Plaintiff also paid Dr. Steinberg an additional $1,700.00 to sit in and listen to the testimony of the first Court appointed expert, Dr. Ciocca, as well as Defendant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Aronov. Further, during Dr. Ciocca’s and Dr. Aronov’s testimony, Dr. Steinberg was in continual communication, in the courtroom, giving counsel and advice to Plaintiff’s attorney for the purposes of cross examining Dr. Ciocca and Dr. Aronov. Said activities were not within the scope of Dr. Steinberg’s appointment as a court appointed expert.
6. The order appointing Dr. Steinberg merely required Dr. Steinberg to “perform a comprehensive psychological evaluation of the parties for purposes of assisting the Court regarding the mental and emotional status of the parties relative to the divorce and fitness for parenting the minor children.”
a. Said order DID NOT provide for Dr. Steinberg to listen to the testimony of the first court appointed expert, Dr. Ciocca, for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff’s attorney to challenge the first court appointed expert’s findings.
b. Said order DID NOT provide for Dr. Steinberg to listen to the testimony of Defendant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Aronov, for the purpose of assisting Plaintiff’s attorney to cross-examine the treating psychologist’s testimony and diagnosis.
7. In addition to the above-mentioned payments, Plaintiff paid Dr. Steinberg another $1,600.00 to appear and testify at trial regarding his so-called “findings”. Critical to the trustworthiness of Dr. Steinberg’s findings are:
a. When first cross-examined by Defendant’s counsel, Dr. Steinberg was asked whether or not some items of the MMPI-2 were omitted by Defendant, and if Dr. Steinberg later met with Defendant and filled in the omitted items, to which Dr. Steinberg answered, “Yes”. Only when Defendant’s counsel asked the follow-up question that by so-doing, the entire MMPI-2 evaluation was invalid, did Dr. Steinberg start scurrying through his notes and conveniently changed his testimony to “No”.
b. When asked about Dr. Steinberg’s scoring of the MMPI-2, Dr. Steinberg testified that he “hand-scored” the MMPI-2. Dr. Aronov, a renowned expert on the MMPI-2, testified that hand-scoring can result in error rates as high as twenty percent (20%). Further, there are numerous erasure marks of the actual MMPI-2 answer sheet.
c. When questioned about certain questions on the MMPI-2 regarding whether a person believed she were being followed all of the time, or if a person believed is somebody is out to get her, Dr. Steinberg became very evasive. The questioning involved elevations on the Defendant’s paranoia scale, and if the facts showed that people were actually following the Defendant, would that result in a false elevation of the paranoia scale. Defendant’s counsel asked DR. Steinberg the same of similar question five times, and then the Court asked a similar question, and Dr. Steinberg’s responses continually evaded the question asked. Such evasion clearly DID NOT assist the Court, as required by this Court’s order.
d. When asked questions regarding the about the reliability of the Rorschach test in a forensic setting, and the subjectiveness of said test, Dr. Steinberg became very evasive, and refused to answer questions regarding his interpretations of the Defendant’s answers, as well as how certain responses would be scored. Dr. Steinberg testified the psychologists were “sworn to secrecy” regarding answering such questions. Both Dr. Ciocca and Dr. Steinberg testified that psychologists were not sworn to secrecy regarding such questions, and Dr. Ciocca further testified that such questions would have to be answered in order to meet Daubert requirements. Accordingly, this in and of itself INVALIDATES Dr. Steinberg’s testimony and findings under the Daubert rule.
8. Plaintiff’s counsel had stated several times that Plaintiff may recall Dr. Steinberg in rebuttal to Dr. Ciocca, the first court appointed expert, and Dr. Aronov. The order appointing Dr. Steinberg clearly does not anticipate one court appointed expert rebutting the testimony of another court appointed expert. Further, said order does not anticipate a court appointed expert rebutting a treating psychologist. Said activities clearly exceed the scope of Dr. Steinberg’s appointment and show that Dr. Steinberg is not a court appointed neutral, but rather a retained expert for the Plaintiff.
9. The “consent order” appointing Dr. Steinberg was for the purposes of Dr. Steinberg acting as a court appointed neutral, not an advocate for the Plaintiff. Defendant DID NOT consent to an evaluation by the Plaintiff’s retained expert. Since Dr. Steinberg has clearly crossed that line, both legally and ethically, said “consent” in invalid, and any testimony, testing, and “findings” as the result of said consent must be stricken.
10. Since Dr. Steinberg refused to answer certain questions regarding the Rorschach test, since Dr. Steinberg hand-scored the MMPI-2, since Dr. Steinberg was evasive to questioning, including the Court’s questions, regarding some of the questions and results of the MMPI-2, and since Dr. Steinberg changed his testimony regarding Defendant omitting certain questions on the MMPI-2 and whether Dr. Steinberg later filled in the answers, Dr. Steinberg’s testimony, testing, and “findings” do not meet the minimal requirements of Daubert.
FROM ALL, DR. Steinberg’s testimony, test results, and “findings” as they relate to
Defendant Danielle Malmquist should be stricken and excluded.
In both cases, the old axiom is clear, “money talks”.
End of Part 1.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
My Story: For the Love of a Child - Part 3 of 4
At the end of Part 2, Judge Whit LaFon had awarded my ex-wife sole custody of my daughter, with me being granted standard visitation. So I went from having my daughter every other week to only having her every other week-end, two weeks during the summer, and alternating holidays. LaFon’s decision was affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals (judges Holly Kirby Lillard, W. Frank Crawford, and Alan E. Highers), even with the documented actions that the Disciplinary Counsel to the Court of the Judiciary found to be judicial misconduct.
Since LaFon “retired” from the bench, thus circumventing a trial before the Court of the Judiciary (see the letter from the Court of the Judiciary posted on the “An Attorney’s Tale” Facebook page), my case was reassigned to Judge Don Allen. The text of the letter is as follows:
As you know, our firm is employed as Disciplinary Counsel to the Tennessee Court of the Judiciary. This letter is to advise you that the complaint you filed against Judge Whit LaFon was submitted to an Investigative Panel of the Court of the Judiciary for consideration. During the pendency of the matter before the Investigative Panel, the Court voted at its semi-annual meeting on August 26, 1998, to dismiss all pending complaints against judges who retired from the bench. The reasoning underlying the decision was that the only punishment the Court could impose following a pubiic [sic] trial of an individual who is no longer a sitting judge would be a private admonition. See Tenn. Code Ann. 17-5-301(f), 17-5-309(a). Therefore, your complaint has been dismissed.
Thanking you for your interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
That last line, as a friend commented, is really ironic. Thanks for wanting to preserve the integrity of the judicial system; however, your complaint is being dismissed because the judge retired and we do not want to be bothered with it now. The question arises, how many judges at the time had complaints pending against them and then decided to retire? The answer, I don’t know, maybe one. Don’t forget, LaFon was the uncle of former vice president Al Gore.
In 2000, I filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment based on, among other things, LaFon’s judicial misconduct in my case and I attached most of the documentation from the Court of the Judiciary to the motion. Judge Don Allen DENIED the motion. So now we have three appellate judges and another circuit judge given documentation of judicial misconduct (not my words but the words of the Disciplinary Counsel of the Court of the Judiciary), and THEY ALL look away. Judges protecting judges, and punishment (via the child custody decision) to the person who reports the judge to the proper authority.
So far in my own case:
1. The guardian ad litem, now juvenile judge Christy Little, does not show up for the first trial, but instead files a report that contains many false statements.
2. The Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, when given documentary evidence of Christy Little’s false statements, dismisses the complaint against her.
3. In a civil lawsuit against Christy Little (represented by the law firm of Rainey, Kizer, Butler, Reviere & Bell), the Tennessee Court of Appeals (judges Alan E. Highers, David R. Farmer, and Holly Kirby Lillard) gives Christy Rauchle Little “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” so that she does not have to stand trial for her misconduct while assigned as guardian ad litem in my case.
4. Judge Whit LaFon commits judicial misconduct in my case, and four judges, three appellate and one circuit, look the other way.
5. The Court of the Judiciary dismisses the complaint against Whit LaFon because he “retired” from the bench.
Surely, all of this cannot have happened in our system of justice. Well it did, and still does, on a daily basis. That is why I posted the other posts after Part 2 of My Story - to put it all in perspective and to show what occurs everyday. The reason - judicial corruption - favoritism, good ole boys, sexism, racism, money, power trips, vindictiveness.
Woe is he who stands up against a judge that has done wrong.
The next post will be Psychologists that go Psycho, and then Part 4 of My Story. In the next weeks, the Bada Fiasco (which brings me back to Jackson, Tennessee and the law firm that represented Christy Little, and yet the remaining Jackson, Tennessee circuit judges).
End of Part 3.
Since LaFon “retired” from the bench, thus circumventing a trial before the Court of the Judiciary (see the letter from the Court of the Judiciary posted on the “An Attorney’s Tale” Facebook page), my case was reassigned to Judge Don Allen. The text of the letter is as follows:
As you know, our firm is employed as Disciplinary Counsel to the Tennessee Court of the Judiciary. This letter is to advise you that the complaint you filed against Judge Whit LaFon was submitted to an Investigative Panel of the Court of the Judiciary for consideration. During the pendency of the matter before the Investigative Panel, the Court voted at its semi-annual meeting on August 26, 1998, to dismiss all pending complaints against judges who retired from the bench. The reasoning underlying the decision was that the only punishment the Court could impose following a pubiic [sic] trial of an individual who is no longer a sitting judge would be a private admonition. See Tenn. Code Ann. 17-5-301(f), 17-5-309(a). Therefore, your complaint has been dismissed.
Thanking you for your interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
That last line, as a friend commented, is really ironic. Thanks for wanting to preserve the integrity of the judicial system; however, your complaint is being dismissed because the judge retired and we do not want to be bothered with it now. The question arises, how many judges at the time had complaints pending against them and then decided to retire? The answer, I don’t know, maybe one. Don’t forget, LaFon was the uncle of former vice president Al Gore.
In 2000, I filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment based on, among other things, LaFon’s judicial misconduct in my case and I attached most of the documentation from the Court of the Judiciary to the motion. Judge Don Allen DENIED the motion. So now we have three appellate judges and another circuit judge given documentation of judicial misconduct (not my words but the words of the Disciplinary Counsel of the Court of the Judiciary), and THEY ALL look away. Judges protecting judges, and punishment (via the child custody decision) to the person who reports the judge to the proper authority.
So far in my own case:
1. The guardian ad litem, now juvenile judge Christy Little, does not show up for the first trial, but instead files a report that contains many false statements.
2. The Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, when given documentary evidence of Christy Little’s false statements, dismisses the complaint against her.
3. In a civil lawsuit against Christy Little (represented by the law firm of Rainey, Kizer, Butler, Reviere & Bell), the Tennessee Court of Appeals (judges Alan E. Highers, David R. Farmer, and Holly Kirby Lillard) gives Christy Rauchle Little “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” so that she does not have to stand trial for her misconduct while assigned as guardian ad litem in my case.
4. Judge Whit LaFon commits judicial misconduct in my case, and four judges, three appellate and one circuit, look the other way.
5. The Court of the Judiciary dismisses the complaint against Whit LaFon because he “retired” from the bench.
Surely, all of this cannot have happened in our system of justice. Well it did, and still does, on a daily basis. That is why I posted the other posts after Part 2 of My Story - to put it all in perspective and to show what occurs everyday. The reason - judicial corruption - favoritism, good ole boys, sexism, racism, money, power trips, vindictiveness.
Woe is he who stands up against a judge that has done wrong.
The next post will be Psychologists that go Psycho, and then Part 4 of My Story. In the next weeks, the Bada Fiasco (which brings me back to Jackson, Tennessee and the law firm that represented Christy Little, and yet the remaining Jackson, Tennessee circuit judges).
End of Part 3.
Monday, February 7, 2011
Facebook Page; Whit LaFon
I just posted the letter from the Court of the Judiciary dismissing the charge against former Judge Whit LaFon (the deceased uncle of former VP Al Gore) because he "retired" from the bench, on An Attorney's Tale Facebook page.
Most documents mentioned in my postings are posted on the Facebook page. To get to the Facebook page, just log onto Facebook and search for An Attorney's Tale and send a friend request. You can also click on the following link and it should take you to it: http://www.facebook.com/?ref=home#!/profile.php?id=100001651287428.
Most documents mentioned in my postings are posted on the Facebook page. To get to the Facebook page, just log onto Facebook and search for An Attorney's Tale and send a friend request. You can also click on the following link and it should take you to it: http://www.facebook.com/?ref=home#!/profile.php?id=100001651287428.
Friday, February 4, 2011
GALs Gone Wild - Part 2 of 2
GALs in child custody cases pretty much operate with impunity. As I stated in My Story: For the Love of a Child - Part 1, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that GALs are entitled to “absolute quasi-judicial immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) (lawsuit by me against then Jackson attorney and now Madison County Juvenile Court Judge Christy Rauchle Little). Such immunity protects people who make knowingly false statements, even if they make them with malice.
I once heard two attorneys in Shelby County discussing a child custody case in the doorway to a courtroom. One said that since your client has more money than mine, I guess the GAL is going to recommend that your client get custody; they then chuckled. The way attorneys in Shelby County think regarding GALs just accentuates Judge Kurtz’s comment in Andrews v. Andrews:
Commenting specifically on the affidavit opining on the common practices and expectations of the local trial courts [Shelby County] and the initial trial judge [Judge Donna Fields], Judge Kurtz observed that it “speaks to an expectation which does not appear in any court order and expresses a role for the GAL and AAL beyond that authorized by the legal authorities.” Judge Kurtz recognized that a local “legal culture ha[d] developed . . . in which the GALs have assumed authority beyond the parameters set forth in the case law,” but added: “[W]hen push comes to shove the law must trump culture.”
In the case of Malmquist v. Malmquist, I filed a Motion to Disqualify Guardian ad Litem (the GAL was Gina Higgins), which I am posting verbatim below due to the atrocities involved. The judge, Jerry Stokes, denied the motion.
Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff Danielle Malmquist, by and through counsel, moves this Court to disqualify the Guardian ad Litem in this cause, and as grounds thereto, states as follows:
1. The Guardian ad Litem in this cause, Gina Higgins (“Higgins”), was appointed without any input from Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff.
2. The Plaintiff in this cause is a pilot with FedEx, and his job title is Assistant Chief Pilot, and reports to Paul Castle, who is the President of West Coast Regions.
3. When a local news station was preparing to air a news segment regarding issues in the divorce and custody dispute between the parties, officials from FedEx called the news station in an attempt to stop the station from airing the story, and threatened legal action. Further, this Court, upon recommendation of Higgins, sealed the divorce proceedings, but subsequently unsealed the proceedings.
4. Higgins is the current President of the Ben. F. Jones Chapter of the National Bar Association (“Jones Chapter NBA”). A past President of the Jones Chapter NBA is Mary Beard, who works for the FedEx Legal Department. The 2005 President of the Jones Chapter NBA was Edward L. Stanton, III, who is also an employee of FedEx. FedEx is a major contributor to the National Bar Association, and FedEx has a link on the National Bar Association’s website, offering member benefits. Accordingly, Higgins has a pecuniary interest, as President of the Jones Chapter NBA, as well as has personal and professional dealings with members of FedEx’s legal department. Further, FedEx, by contacting the news station and threatening legal action, has placed itself squarely in these proceedings on behalf of the Plaintiff / Counter-Defendant.
5. On or about January 6, 2007, former counsel for Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff took the deposition of Higgins. Higgins blatantly refused to answer questions regarding Higgins personal relationship with the Court. Specifically, the testimony was:
Q. I asked you a question yesterday but I guess I need to have it confirmed on the record under oath. As I understand it, there’s been no prior relationship between you and Judge Stokes; is that correct?
A. I’ll answer that question if y’all tell me who gave y’all this information.
Q. Ms. Higgins.
A. I’ll answer that question if you tell me who suggested there was a relationship between myself and Judge Stokes.
Q. My client is the one who –
A. Where did she get her information?
Q. I am the one taking this deposition today.
A. Then I’m not going to answer it.
Q. You’re refusing to answer the question?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Based on what grounds?
A. I’m just not going to answer.
Q. Well, then I’ll just have to cite you for contempt.
A. Please do.
Higgins is a licensed attorney and an assistant divorce referee with the Shelby County Circuit Court. Higgins is well aware of the rules regarding discovery, and blatantly refused to answer questions that are discoverable, in this instance, regarding any possible bias or prejudice between Higgins and the Court.
6. Based on the foregoing, there exists a conflict of interest, as well as bias or the appearance of bias, on the part of Higgins, all of which have been in existence since Higgins’ appointment. Further, Higgins has refused, without proper objection, to answer questions at her deposition.
7. Further, Higgins has demanded payments from Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff, yet refused to provide an itemized billing. Further, regarding a request for a billing statement, Higgins stated in an email dated August 17, 2006, as follows:
As to a billing statement from me, why do you need one. I have not taken the time to prepare a detailed bill in this case. I am not inclined to waste my time. If you agree to and send me a check (for no less than $4,000), I will take the time to submit an invoice. You should know that it will reflect a lot more than $4,000 or $8,000 for the work done in this case. Otherwise, I am not going to waste my time. (see email, attached as Exhibit 1.)
Unfortunately for the children who are the subject of child custody disputes, the actions depicted in this and the previous posting are not exceptions, but rather they are examples of what goes on day in and day out in child custody cases. The GALs, and the judges that appoint them, must be reined in.
End of Part 2.
I once heard two attorneys in Shelby County discussing a child custody case in the doorway to a courtroom. One said that since your client has more money than mine, I guess the GAL is going to recommend that your client get custody; they then chuckled. The way attorneys in Shelby County think regarding GALs just accentuates Judge Kurtz’s comment in Andrews v. Andrews:
Commenting specifically on the affidavit opining on the common practices and expectations of the local trial courts [Shelby County] and the initial trial judge [Judge Donna Fields], Judge Kurtz observed that it “speaks to an expectation which does not appear in any court order and expresses a role for the GAL and AAL beyond that authorized by the legal authorities.” Judge Kurtz recognized that a local “legal culture ha[d] developed . . . in which the GALs have assumed authority beyond the parameters set forth in the case law,” but added: “[W]hen push comes to shove the law must trump culture.”
In the case of Malmquist v. Malmquist, I filed a Motion to Disqualify Guardian ad Litem (the GAL was Gina Higgins), which I am posting verbatim below due to the atrocities involved. The judge, Jerry Stokes, denied the motion.
Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff Danielle Malmquist, by and through counsel, moves this Court to disqualify the Guardian ad Litem in this cause, and as grounds thereto, states as follows:
1. The Guardian ad Litem in this cause, Gina Higgins (“Higgins”), was appointed without any input from Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff.
2. The Plaintiff in this cause is a pilot with FedEx, and his job title is Assistant Chief Pilot, and reports to Paul Castle, who is the President of West Coast Regions.
3. When a local news station was preparing to air a news segment regarding issues in the divorce and custody dispute between the parties, officials from FedEx called the news station in an attempt to stop the station from airing the story, and threatened legal action. Further, this Court, upon recommendation of Higgins, sealed the divorce proceedings, but subsequently unsealed the proceedings.
4. Higgins is the current President of the Ben. F. Jones Chapter of the National Bar Association (“Jones Chapter NBA”). A past President of the Jones Chapter NBA is Mary Beard, who works for the FedEx Legal Department. The 2005 President of the Jones Chapter NBA was Edward L. Stanton, III, who is also an employee of FedEx. FedEx is a major contributor to the National Bar Association, and FedEx has a link on the National Bar Association’s website, offering member benefits. Accordingly, Higgins has a pecuniary interest, as President of the Jones Chapter NBA, as well as has personal and professional dealings with members of FedEx’s legal department. Further, FedEx, by contacting the news station and threatening legal action, has placed itself squarely in these proceedings on behalf of the Plaintiff / Counter-Defendant.
5. On or about January 6, 2007, former counsel for Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff took the deposition of Higgins. Higgins blatantly refused to answer questions regarding Higgins personal relationship with the Court. Specifically, the testimony was:
Q. I asked you a question yesterday but I guess I need to have it confirmed on the record under oath. As I understand it, there’s been no prior relationship between you and Judge Stokes; is that correct?
A. I’ll answer that question if y’all tell me who gave y’all this information.
Q. Ms. Higgins.
A. I’ll answer that question if you tell me who suggested there was a relationship between myself and Judge Stokes.
Q. My client is the one who –
A. Where did she get her information?
Q. I am the one taking this deposition today.
A. Then I’m not going to answer it.
Q. You’re refusing to answer the question?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Based on what grounds?
A. I’m just not going to answer.
Q. Well, then I’ll just have to cite you for contempt.
A. Please do.
Higgins is a licensed attorney and an assistant divorce referee with the Shelby County Circuit Court. Higgins is well aware of the rules regarding discovery, and blatantly refused to answer questions that are discoverable, in this instance, regarding any possible bias or prejudice between Higgins and the Court.
6. Based on the foregoing, there exists a conflict of interest, as well as bias or the appearance of bias, on the part of Higgins, all of which have been in existence since Higgins’ appointment. Further, Higgins has refused, without proper objection, to answer questions at her deposition.
7. Further, Higgins has demanded payments from Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff, yet refused to provide an itemized billing. Further, regarding a request for a billing statement, Higgins stated in an email dated August 17, 2006, as follows:
As to a billing statement from me, why do you need one. I have not taken the time to prepare a detailed bill in this case. I am not inclined to waste my time. If you agree to and send me a check (for no less than $4,000), I will take the time to submit an invoice. You should know that it will reflect a lot more than $4,000 or $8,000 for the work done in this case. Otherwise, I am not going to waste my time. (see email, attached as Exhibit 1.)
Unfortunately for the children who are the subject of child custody disputes, the actions depicted in this and the previous posting are not exceptions, but rather they are examples of what goes on day in and day out in child custody cases. The GALs, and the judges that appoint them, must be reined in.
End of Part 2.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
GALs Gone Wild - Part 1 of 2
The guardian ad litem (aka the law guardian). The concept of the GAL started in dependency and neglect cases or child abuse cases where actions by the state were taken against the child’s parents, and someone was actually needed to legally look out for the child. However, somewhere along the way the lines got blurred and many judges in divorce cases (particularly in Shelby County, hence “the Shelby County way”) started routinely appointing GALs. Of course, that is the lazy judge’s way out of deciding a case.
Of course, in Shelby County, Tennessee, the attorney that is appointed as GAL, and how much work the GAL does, really depends on the finances of one or both of the parents. There are several law firms that do mostly GAL work; of course, they only accept appointments where at least one of the parents has significant resources. When they accept those appointments, they make sure they do a significant amount of work to milk the case for as much money as they can.
In Andrews v. Andrews (the link is attached on the FB page), Judge Kurtz (from outside Shelby County), as described by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, made some very candid observations about the use of GALs and attorney ad litems (AAL) in Shelby County. He stated:
The Court notes that the total cost of attorney’s fees in this case for the parties’ multiple and successive lawyers, guardian ad litem [S. Denise McCrary] and attorney ad litem [C. Suzanne Landers] will be over $800,000, and perhaps as high as $1,000,000. Such cost is a mark of the failure of the legal system to effectively deal with and minimize the emotional and financial conflicts inherent in ending the parties’ marriage.
The trial court commented on the “weighty” roles in the litigation of both the GAL and the AAL, contrary to the normally “circumspect role” of attorneys appointed for the benefit of a child in a custody dispute. It noted, however, that the issue of the fees for the GAL and the AAL had been reserved for later.
…
At the outset of the order, Judge Kurtz outlined the roles of a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem, as discussed in Toms v. Toms, 209 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).23 Quoting Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 730 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), Judge Kurtz also discussed the discretion afforded to a guardian ad litem, and the problems that arise when a guardian ad litem “undertakes tasks or assumes a role that is overly-expansive, not useful, or otherwise inappropriate.”
Summarizing the law on such guardians, Judge Kurtz stated: None of the case law . . . gives the GAL authority to be a mediator, ombudsman, special master or a mini judge. The GAL is only to protect the child’s interest and gather and present sufficient facts for the court’s consideration: nothing more or nothing less.
Commenting specifically on the affidavit opining on the common practices and expectations of the local trial courts [Shelby County] and the initial trial judge [Judge Donna Fields], Judge Kurtz observed that it “speaks to an expectation which does not appear in any court order and expresses a role for the GAL and AAL beyond that authorized by the legal authorities.” Judge Kurtz recognized that a local “legal culture ha[d] developed . . . in which the GALs have assumed authority beyond the parameters set forth in the case law,” but added: “[W]hen push comes to shove the law must trump culture.”
In one of my previous cases, Ghawji v. Ghawji, Judge Donna Fields appointed and re-appointed the GAL, Suzanne Landers, for various issues that Judge Kurtz states is “authority beyond the parameters set forth in case law”, and for which Landers kept running up unnecessary charges and billing my client.
And what type of work does a GAL do? Well in the Anna Mae He case, the GAL, Kimbrough Mullins, read a book about China, and then magically became an expert on Chinese culture. From the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion (the link is attached on the FB page):
The guardian ad litem testified that she did not recommend visitation because “the status quo was that the child had not seen her biological parents in a number of months, I didn't believe that throwing the child into something different than the status quo was necessarily in her best interest.” The guardian ad litem continued to oppose visitation and reunification with the parents throughout the proceedings. She believed that A.M.H. was attached to the Bakers and considered them to be her parents, although the guardian ad litem had never seen A.M.H. with her biological parents. She further stated that she had read a book about Chinese girls being placed in orphanages and consequently was concerned that the parents wanted to return to China:
From the very beginning of the case, it was very clear to me that [the parents’] intention was that if the child were returned to them, they wanted to go back to China. They have never said anything different than that. They have always said that when this case is over they would like to take her back. . . . I honestly can't tell the Court today I know to an absolute certainty what kind of life she would have there. This book that I read caused me some concerns.
My favorite part of the Anna Mae He opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court is:
The attorney ad litem and guardian ad litem are hereby ordered relieved of any further participation in proceedings concerning A.M.H.
End of Part 1.
Of course, in Shelby County, Tennessee, the attorney that is appointed as GAL, and how much work the GAL does, really depends on the finances of one or both of the parents. There are several law firms that do mostly GAL work; of course, they only accept appointments where at least one of the parents has significant resources. When they accept those appointments, they make sure they do a significant amount of work to milk the case for as much money as they can.
In Andrews v. Andrews (the link is attached on the FB page), Judge Kurtz (from outside Shelby County), as described by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, made some very candid observations about the use of GALs and attorney ad litems (AAL) in Shelby County. He stated:
The Court notes that the total cost of attorney’s fees in this case for the parties’ multiple and successive lawyers, guardian ad litem [S. Denise McCrary] and attorney ad litem [C. Suzanne Landers] will be over $800,000, and perhaps as high as $1,000,000. Such cost is a mark of the failure of the legal system to effectively deal with and minimize the emotional and financial conflicts inherent in ending the parties’ marriage.
The trial court commented on the “weighty” roles in the litigation of both the GAL and the AAL, contrary to the normally “circumspect role” of attorneys appointed for the benefit of a child in a custody dispute. It noted, however, that the issue of the fees for the GAL and the AAL had been reserved for later.
…
At the outset of the order, Judge Kurtz outlined the roles of a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem, as discussed in Toms v. Toms, 209 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).23 Quoting Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 730 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), Judge Kurtz also discussed the discretion afforded to a guardian ad litem, and the problems that arise when a guardian ad litem “undertakes tasks or assumes a role that is overly-expansive, not useful, or otherwise inappropriate.”
Summarizing the law on such guardians, Judge Kurtz stated: None of the case law . . . gives the GAL authority to be a mediator, ombudsman, special master or a mini judge. The GAL is only to protect the child’s interest and gather and present sufficient facts for the court’s consideration: nothing more or nothing less.
Commenting specifically on the affidavit opining on the common practices and expectations of the local trial courts [Shelby County] and the initial trial judge [Judge Donna Fields], Judge Kurtz observed that it “speaks to an expectation which does not appear in any court order and expresses a role for the GAL and AAL beyond that authorized by the legal authorities.” Judge Kurtz recognized that a local “legal culture ha[d] developed . . . in which the GALs have assumed authority beyond the parameters set forth in the case law,” but added: “[W]hen push comes to shove the law must trump culture.”
In one of my previous cases, Ghawji v. Ghawji, Judge Donna Fields appointed and re-appointed the GAL, Suzanne Landers, for various issues that Judge Kurtz states is “authority beyond the parameters set forth in case law”, and for which Landers kept running up unnecessary charges and billing my client.
And what type of work does a GAL do? Well in the Anna Mae He case, the GAL, Kimbrough Mullins, read a book about China, and then magically became an expert on Chinese culture. From the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion (the link is attached on the FB page):
The guardian ad litem testified that she did not recommend visitation because “the status quo was that the child had not seen her biological parents in a number of months, I didn't believe that throwing the child into something different than the status quo was necessarily in her best interest.” The guardian ad litem continued to oppose visitation and reunification with the parents throughout the proceedings. She believed that A.M.H. was attached to the Bakers and considered them to be her parents, although the guardian ad litem had never seen A.M.H. with her biological parents. She further stated that she had read a book about Chinese girls being placed in orphanages and consequently was concerned that the parents wanted to return to China:
From the very beginning of the case, it was very clear to me that [the parents’] intention was that if the child were returned to them, they wanted to go back to China. They have never said anything different than that. They have always said that when this case is over they would like to take her back. . . . I honestly can't tell the Court today I know to an absolute certainty what kind of life she would have there. This book that I read caused me some concerns.
My favorite part of the Anna Mae He opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court is:
The attorney ad litem and guardian ad litem are hereby ordered relieved of any further participation in proceedings concerning A.M.H.
End of Part 1.
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
The Anna Mae He case
The following is the story of Anna Mae He. The case originated in front of former Chancellor D.J. Allisandratos. Allisandratos removed himself from the case after complaints were made against him to the Tennessee Court of the Judiciary. Allisandratos’ hands had already shaped the case, though, because he issued orders preventing contact between Anna Mae and her “real” parents, the Hes. The case was then transferred to Circuit Court Judge Childers, who terminated the He’s parental rights, a decision that was REVERSED by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The link to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion is located on the An Attorney’s Tale Facebook page.
Allisandratos, who did not run for re-election after the He case, ran an elitist court from the most arrogant point of view. He would terminate parental rights at the drop of a hat. Two of my cases that were in his court will be discussed in later postings. After Judge Childers’ made his decision in the He case, Childers was scornful to attorneys that publicly decried his decision.
The following is directly quoted from the free public domain website of:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Custody_battle_for_Anna_Mae_He
Anna Mae He, born January 28, 1999 in the United States, was the subject of a custody battle between her Chinese biological parents, Shaoqiang (Jack) He and Qin Luo "Casey" He, and her foster parents, Jerry and Louise Baker. The case received United States national media attention for years and revolved around the claim of Jerry and Louise Baker that Jack and Casey He abandoned their rights to the child when they signed a temporary custody order.
Background
Anna Mae He's father, Jack, came to the United States in 1995 on a student visa and attended Arizona State. In 1997 he enrolled in University of Memphis, receiving a scholarship and a stipend for work as a graduate assistant. Anna Mae's mother, Casey, obtained a visa as Jack's wife and shortly after coming to the United States became pregnant with Anna Mae.
During the pregnancy, Jack was accused of sexual assault by a fellow student six days after the reported event in October 1998. The University conducted an investigation of the alleged assault and determined that no one saw Jack or the alleged victim together at the time and location in question. Despite the lack of incriminating evidence, Jack He's graduate assistant position was terminated by the school, resulting in the loss of his stipend and health insurance. Jack He was charged with attempted rape, but was acquitted by a jury in February 2002. Later during the pregnancy, the couple was involved in an altercation with the alleged rape victim and the alleged victim's husband in a grocery store. Casey was knocked down and suffered vaginal bleeding. Her condition worsened afterward until Anna was delivered by Caesarean section two months later. Faced with a $12,000 hospital bill and a criminal charge with no stable income, the couple sought help from Mid-South Christian Services which agreed to place the baby in a foster home with Jerry and Louise Baker for three months. During this time Jack He was arrested for the previous sexual assault accusation, which caused the loss of his new job. With only Casey's income as a waitress to survive on, the Hes searched for someone to take Anna Mae back to China to be cared for by relatives but were unable to find anyone.
Disagreement
Unable to financially care for Anna Mae, the Hes decided to let her remain in the Bakers' custody. The Bakers expressed interest in adopting Anna Mae but the Hes were unwilling. An agreement was reached that would give the Bakers temporary custody and let the Hes retain parental rights. The Bakers claim there was also an oral agreement that the Bakers would raise Anna Mae until she is eighteen years old. But the Hes contend that they did not agree to this and that the arrangement was only temporary. A juvenile court officer's testimony supports the Hes' claim.
On June 2, 1999, Jack He and the Bakers meet with a Mid-South Christian Services attorney. In the meeting, the attorney told Jack it would be necessary to go to court to regain custody if all parties did not agree to a change in custody.
On June 4, 1999, the Hes and the Bakers went to the Shelby County Juvenile Court to obtain the consent order transferring custody to the Bakers. Without the knowledge of either party, the juvenile court officer typed a guardianship provision into the consent order. Because Casey He did not speak or read English very well, she was unable to read the documents and had to rely on an interpreter for their meaning. Three witnesses, including the interpreter, reported that Casey was very concerned that the Bakers' custody of Anna Mae be temporary. The juvenile court officer testified that she was "adamant that at some point she wanted her child back." She was told that signing the consent order was necessary for Anna Mae to obtain health insurance and the interpreter testified that she signed the order believing custody to be temporary.
The Hes continued to visit Anna Mae regularly for about an hour a week. Louise Baker began to keep a diary in which she documented the Hes' visits to Anna Mae, writing down when the visits were, how long they lasted, how the Hes interacted with Anna Mae, and what gifts they gave her. In October 1999, friction began when the Hes wanted to take Anna Mae out of the Bakers' home and the Bakers refused. Louise Baker wrote "We would like to get visits to every other week. We feel like they would wean away, but the last 2 visits we could see Casey is wanting to come more." In November 1999, Jack He told Jerry Baker they wanted to regain custody of Anna Mae. Jerry replied that they did not want to give up Anna Mae and that Louise was pregnant and he didn't want her to miscarry. The Hes contacted the juvenile court officer several times during these months complaining about problems with visitation and talking about wanting to get custody back.
In May 2000, the Hes petitioned the Juvenile Court for custody. The petition was denied.
Jack found work in Georgia and Casey continued to visit Anna Mae until one day she refused to leave the Bakers' home. The police were called. Jack quit his job in Georgia after the Bakers told him that Casey was not allowed to visit Anna Mae by herself.
The Hes continued to visit Anna Mae until January 28, 2001 when an argument occurred at the Bakers' home. The Hes wanted to take Anna Mae to a photography studio for a family portrait on her second birthday, but the Bakers refused. The Bakers subsequently called the police. The Hes were told that they could not return to the Bakers' home. The police officer later testified that he said they could not return to the Bakers' house that day but the Hes believed they were being told that they could not return to the Bakers' home at all. The Hes did not see Anna Mae again for years.
The Hes contacted the Juvenile Court about regaining custody and in April 2001 filed to regain custody, but since only Casey signed, the petition was refiled on May 29. A hearing was set for June 6 but was rescheduled to June 22 so that the Bakers' lawyer could attend. Meanwhile, the Bakers were advised by their attorney to file to revoke the Hes' parental rights. On June 20, 2001, four months and five days after the January argument, they filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. This halted the Hes' petition in juvenile court and transferred the case to chancery court.
Case history
In May 2000, Hes petition Juvenile Court for custody of Anna Mae. The petition was denied.
In April 2001, Hes petition Juvenile Court for custody of Anna Mae.
In June 2001, Bakers petition Chancery Court to adopt Anna Mae citing abandonment and lack of financial support from Hes.
In May 2004 after a 10-day trial, Judge Robert L. Childers, a Tennessee circuit judge, terminated Hes' parental rights on grounds of willful abandonment, despite Hes' persistent effort to get custody back via Juvenile Court. This decision was later affirmed by a majority in the Tennessee Court of Appeals on 2005-11-23. Hes subsequently appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
In October 2006, Hes argue at the Tennessee Supreme Court that the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights. They contend that the facts do not support a finding of willful abandonment, as their repeated effort to seek custody via juvenile court was a clear attempt to visit Anna Mae. After the oral argument, the Hes submitted a motion pro se to the Tennessee Supreme Court, asking the high Court to rule on the custody issue directly. On how to interpret the word "temporary", in their pro se motion to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Hes maintained that the temporary nature of the custody arrangement hinged on the temporary nature of the hardship they experienced at the time of the arrangement. Therefore, the Hes argue that they have superior parental rights over the custody dispute, as the exception laid out in a landmark Tennessee Supreme Court decision (Blair v. Badenhope) should apply.
In January 2007, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, authored by Chief Justice William M. Barker, reversed the ruling by the state Court of Appeals and ordered that Anna Mae He be returned to her biological parents. In its ruling, the Court said, "We hold that the parents of Anna Mae He did not voluntarily transfer custody and guardianship of Anna Mae He to the Bakers with knowledge of the consequences and, therefore are entitled to superior rights to custody." and "the evidence does not support a 'willful failure to visit' as a ground for abandonment." The case must now cycle back through the Shelby County Chancery Court as the process of returning the child to her biological parents begins. The Bakers will have to pay all legal fees, according to the opinion.
After the judgment was entered, on 2007-02-02, the Bakers motioned the Tennessee Supreme Court to rehear the case and stay the custody transfer. The Tennessee Supreme Court promptly denied both motions on 2007-02-09 and ordered the Bakers to pay costs "for which execution may issue if necessary".
Immediately thereafter, the Bakers petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the transfer of custody. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Bakers' requests on 2007-02-12.
The Bakers then petitioned for habeas corpus relief as "friend" of Anna Mae in U.S. Federal District Court, claiming that Anna Mae was under the custody of Tennessee state. The federal judge denied the petition.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Bakers' petition for writ of certiorari in mid-2007, thus ending the legal battle.
.
Allisandratos, who did not run for re-election after the He case, ran an elitist court from the most arrogant point of view. He would terminate parental rights at the drop of a hat. Two of my cases that were in his court will be discussed in later postings. After Judge Childers’ made his decision in the He case, Childers was scornful to attorneys that publicly decried his decision.
The following is directly quoted from the free public domain website of:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Custody_battle_for_Anna_Mae_He
Anna Mae He, born January 28, 1999 in the United States, was the subject of a custody battle between her Chinese biological parents, Shaoqiang (Jack) He and Qin Luo "Casey" He, and her foster parents, Jerry and Louise Baker. The case received United States national media attention for years and revolved around the claim of Jerry and Louise Baker that Jack and Casey He abandoned their rights to the child when they signed a temporary custody order.
Background
Anna Mae He's father, Jack, came to the United States in 1995 on a student visa and attended Arizona State. In 1997 he enrolled in University of Memphis, receiving a scholarship and a stipend for work as a graduate assistant. Anna Mae's mother, Casey, obtained a visa as Jack's wife and shortly after coming to the United States became pregnant with Anna Mae.
During the pregnancy, Jack was accused of sexual assault by a fellow student six days after the reported event in October 1998. The University conducted an investigation of the alleged assault and determined that no one saw Jack or the alleged victim together at the time and location in question. Despite the lack of incriminating evidence, Jack He's graduate assistant position was terminated by the school, resulting in the loss of his stipend and health insurance. Jack He was charged with attempted rape, but was acquitted by a jury in February 2002. Later during the pregnancy, the couple was involved in an altercation with the alleged rape victim and the alleged victim's husband in a grocery store. Casey was knocked down and suffered vaginal bleeding. Her condition worsened afterward until Anna was delivered by Caesarean section two months later. Faced with a $12,000 hospital bill and a criminal charge with no stable income, the couple sought help from Mid-South Christian Services which agreed to place the baby in a foster home with Jerry and Louise Baker for three months. During this time Jack He was arrested for the previous sexual assault accusation, which caused the loss of his new job. With only Casey's income as a waitress to survive on, the Hes searched for someone to take Anna Mae back to China to be cared for by relatives but were unable to find anyone.
Disagreement
Unable to financially care for Anna Mae, the Hes decided to let her remain in the Bakers' custody. The Bakers expressed interest in adopting Anna Mae but the Hes were unwilling. An agreement was reached that would give the Bakers temporary custody and let the Hes retain parental rights. The Bakers claim there was also an oral agreement that the Bakers would raise Anna Mae until she is eighteen years old. But the Hes contend that they did not agree to this and that the arrangement was only temporary. A juvenile court officer's testimony supports the Hes' claim.
On June 2, 1999, Jack He and the Bakers meet with a Mid-South Christian Services attorney. In the meeting, the attorney told Jack it would be necessary to go to court to regain custody if all parties did not agree to a change in custody.
On June 4, 1999, the Hes and the Bakers went to the Shelby County Juvenile Court to obtain the consent order transferring custody to the Bakers. Without the knowledge of either party, the juvenile court officer typed a guardianship provision into the consent order. Because Casey He did not speak or read English very well, she was unable to read the documents and had to rely on an interpreter for their meaning. Three witnesses, including the interpreter, reported that Casey was very concerned that the Bakers' custody of Anna Mae be temporary. The juvenile court officer testified that she was "adamant that at some point she wanted her child back." She was told that signing the consent order was necessary for Anna Mae to obtain health insurance and the interpreter testified that she signed the order believing custody to be temporary.
The Hes continued to visit Anna Mae regularly for about an hour a week. Louise Baker began to keep a diary in which she documented the Hes' visits to Anna Mae, writing down when the visits were, how long they lasted, how the Hes interacted with Anna Mae, and what gifts they gave her. In October 1999, friction began when the Hes wanted to take Anna Mae out of the Bakers' home and the Bakers refused. Louise Baker wrote "We would like to get visits to every other week. We feel like they would wean away, but the last 2 visits we could see Casey is wanting to come more." In November 1999, Jack He told Jerry Baker they wanted to regain custody of Anna Mae. Jerry replied that they did not want to give up Anna Mae and that Louise was pregnant and he didn't want her to miscarry. The Hes contacted the juvenile court officer several times during these months complaining about problems with visitation and talking about wanting to get custody back.
In May 2000, the Hes petitioned the Juvenile Court for custody. The petition was denied.
Jack found work in Georgia and Casey continued to visit Anna Mae until one day she refused to leave the Bakers' home. The police were called. Jack quit his job in Georgia after the Bakers told him that Casey was not allowed to visit Anna Mae by herself.
The Hes continued to visit Anna Mae until January 28, 2001 when an argument occurred at the Bakers' home. The Hes wanted to take Anna Mae to a photography studio for a family portrait on her second birthday, but the Bakers refused. The Bakers subsequently called the police. The Hes were told that they could not return to the Bakers' home. The police officer later testified that he said they could not return to the Bakers' house that day but the Hes believed they were being told that they could not return to the Bakers' home at all. The Hes did not see Anna Mae again for years.
The Hes contacted the Juvenile Court about regaining custody and in April 2001 filed to regain custody, but since only Casey signed, the petition was refiled on May 29. A hearing was set for June 6 but was rescheduled to June 22 so that the Bakers' lawyer could attend. Meanwhile, the Bakers were advised by their attorney to file to revoke the Hes' parental rights. On June 20, 2001, four months and five days after the January argument, they filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. This halted the Hes' petition in juvenile court and transferred the case to chancery court.
Case history
In May 2000, Hes petition Juvenile Court for custody of Anna Mae. The petition was denied.
In April 2001, Hes petition Juvenile Court for custody of Anna Mae.
In June 2001, Bakers petition Chancery Court to adopt Anna Mae citing abandonment and lack of financial support from Hes.
In May 2004 after a 10-day trial, Judge Robert L. Childers, a Tennessee circuit judge, terminated Hes' parental rights on grounds of willful abandonment, despite Hes' persistent effort to get custody back via Juvenile Court. This decision was later affirmed by a majority in the Tennessee Court of Appeals on 2005-11-23. Hes subsequently appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
In October 2006, Hes argue at the Tennessee Supreme Court that the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights. They contend that the facts do not support a finding of willful abandonment, as their repeated effort to seek custody via juvenile court was a clear attempt to visit Anna Mae. After the oral argument, the Hes submitted a motion pro se to the Tennessee Supreme Court, asking the high Court to rule on the custody issue directly. On how to interpret the word "temporary", in their pro se motion to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Hes maintained that the temporary nature of the custody arrangement hinged on the temporary nature of the hardship they experienced at the time of the arrangement. Therefore, the Hes argue that they have superior parental rights over the custody dispute, as the exception laid out in a landmark Tennessee Supreme Court decision (Blair v. Badenhope) should apply.
In January 2007, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, authored by Chief Justice William M. Barker, reversed the ruling by the state Court of Appeals and ordered that Anna Mae He be returned to her biological parents. In its ruling, the Court said, "We hold that the parents of Anna Mae He did not voluntarily transfer custody and guardianship of Anna Mae He to the Bakers with knowledge of the consequences and, therefore are entitled to superior rights to custody." and "the evidence does not support a 'willful failure to visit' as a ground for abandonment." The case must now cycle back through the Shelby County Chancery Court as the process of returning the child to her biological parents begins. The Bakers will have to pay all legal fees, according to the opinion.
After the judgment was entered, on 2007-02-02, the Bakers motioned the Tennessee Supreme Court to rehear the case and stay the custody transfer. The Tennessee Supreme Court promptly denied both motions on 2007-02-09 and ordered the Bakers to pay costs "for which execution may issue if necessary".
Immediately thereafter, the Bakers petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the transfer of custody. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Bakers' requests on 2007-02-12.
The Bakers then petitioned for habeas corpus relief as "friend" of Anna Mae in U.S. Federal District Court, claiming that Anna Mae was under the custody of Tennessee state. The federal judge denied the petition.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Bakers' petition for writ of certiorari in mid-2007, thus ending the legal battle.
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